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Abstract 
Risk analysis of offshore wells decommissioning, and abandonment processes is challenging due 
to limited life-cycle information of the well, and failure data of safety barriers in place. To this 
end, it is essential to capture and implement the variability associated with the sparse data for 
conducting risk analysis with considerable confidence level. The hierarchical Bayesian analysis 
provides a viable alternative to address the uncertainty of the data through aggregation for each 
causation. Bayesian network, through its robust computation engine, is used to define dependence 
of causations and uses Bayes’ theorem to update the analysis as new information becomes 
available. In addition, the Bayesian network helps to represent complex dependencies among 
causations through appropriate relaxation strategy to minimize uncertainty in the data, link 
parameter of interest, and overall accident scenario modelling. This paper presents the integration 
of Hierarchical Bayesian model with a Bayesian network to conduct the risk analysis of well 
decommissioning and abandonment processes. The proposed methodology is illustrated using a 
well plugging and abandonment operational failure reported by the Department of Mineral 
Management Service (MMS). The results demonstrate the potential of the proposed approach as a 
robust means to study complex well decommissioning activities. 
  
Keywords: Bayesian networks; Hierarchical Bayesian model; failure analysis; well 
plugging and abandonment; decommissioning  
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1. Introduction 
Well plugging and abandonment (P & A) operations are susceptible to unusual events as the 
reservoir conditions may evolve during or after the cessation of the production phase. The failure 
of these abandoned wells is driven by chemical, mechanical and physical causations (Kiran et al. 
2017). The escape of hydrocarbon to the surface can be hazardous especially when an ignition 
source is present. Also, the formation fluids severity (sour or non-sour) can pose devastating 
threats with catastrophic consequence, in the event of a leak, making safety a major concern. These 
consequences may be exacerbated by the proximity of the P & A platform to nearby properties 
and the environment. Generally, P & A wells are expected to provide a permanent seal to a non-
producing wellbore such that no reason would warrant re-entering into the well. However, well 
barriers often fail for a variety of reasons, notably, degradation, cement shrinkage and 
noncompliance among others. The process of permanent P & A aims at ensuring that a minimum 
of two cement plugs and a mechanical barrier (NORSOK D-010, 2013) are set at strategic intervals 
to contain possible migration of hydrocarbon uphole. These barriers tend to fail, although in no 
particular order, but one failure can trigger another in a complex interaction leading to consequent 
hydrocarbon leakage to the seabed. More recently, the Elgin well failure investigatory reports 
revealed that a “unique” corrosion event of the casings within the wellbore is the primary reason 
for the gas leak incident (Gergerechi et al. 2016; Total, 2013). To this end, various factors may 
weaken the barriers, and the reservoir conditions are difficult to ascertain during cessation of the 
production phase. Also, inspection data kept by oil and gas operators are often either, incomplete 
or lacking relevant sections due to change management, making the available data for safety 
analysis sparse. This sparsity of data, due to limited experience and knowledge of the overall 
uncertainty, are obtained from different sources such as experts’ opinions and analogous 
information from similar activities. Therefore, a sophisticated risk analysis approach capable of 
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quantifying and managing these uncertainties through convergence is required to provide a 
considerable level of confidence before and during the P & A operation. Many authors have 
developed and proposed a variety of methods to overcome the uncertain and scattered data 
concerns. For example, Lavasani et al. (2015) utilised the fuzzy set and possibility theory through 
fault tree analysis to quantify leakage risk in abandoned oil and natural-gas wells. Schobi et al. 
(2016) proposed a sampling technique using polynomial-chaos kriging to estimate the failure 
probability of rare events. A hybrid framework based on importance splitting method was also 
proposed for quantifying rare event failure probability (Chakraborty et al., 2017). Monte-Carlo 
simulation and surrogate models in composite systems have also been investigated (Li et al., 2011; 
Hua et al. 2015). Although efforts have been made to provide efficient frameworks for estimating 
complex events’ failure probability, however, the accuracy of these methods often depend on the 
assumptions made on model formulation and parameter accuracy. Babaleye et al. (2019b) 
proposed a model to handle the evolving conditions of the well barriers, their failure dependencies 
and uncertainty in the data. The model uses advanced logic conditions such as Noisy-OR and leaky 
Noisy-OR to define the conditions and data dependency. However, this model incorporated 
unrefined data in its analysis and relied on Bayesian networks (BN) robust engine to handle 
uncertainties associated with the data, paving the way for a more advanced approach. More 
recently, hierarchical Bayesian analysis (HBA) have been adopted due to its capabilities in 
aggregating source-to-source data in a systematic manner with underlying assumptions that scale 
and shape parameters are functions of distributions of interest (Babaleye and Kurt, 2019a; Arzaghi 
et al., 2018; El-Gheriani et al., 2017a; El-Gheriani et al., 2017b; Yang et al., 2013; Yan et al., 2010; 
Siu et al., 1998). In this literature, forms of HBA have been trained with accident precursor data 
(APD) sourced from locations of varying legislation, well types and operations, geological and 
 4 
environmental conditions. These analogous data further introduce uncertainty to the accident 
analysis. 
  Well P & A, like many other complex engineering systems, is characterized by a high level 
of uncertainty. This uncertainty, involving an increased number of formation fluids-barriers 
mechanisms and their interacting dependencies, require a robust probabilistic risk analysis tool 
like BNs. Moreover, the safety analysis of an offshore well undergoing P&A operation, requires 
accurate knowledge of all the variables and their impacts and failure data. Therefore, it is essential 
to model the inherent risks, in its entirety adequately, only then can the overall risk plan be 
complete, comprehensive and effective. It is to be noted that BNs are limited in their ability to 
accurately elicit the uncertainty between causations and their effects, in the form of conditional 
probability tables (CPT). Typically, these interactions are often modelled as though all causations 
are influencing the effects. In practice, this need not be true as parameters may be over- or under-
defined. In the context of well P & A, it is necessary to model these parameters accurately to make 
the risk analysis realistic, as these CPT parameters often rely on expert judgements or literature 
during the decommissioning planning phase.  
Based on the foregoing, the present study aims at developing a comprehensive data collection 
and failure analysis formalism for an offshore oil and gas well subject to ongoing decommissioning 
and abandonment operation. The formalism relies on the integration of hierarchichal Bayesian 
analysis and Bayesian network model to conduct and assess the risks inherent in the causations of 
a well P&A operational failure. Dependency among interacting causations established based on a 
joint probability distribution and elicitation of an advanced logic gate within the CPTs, which has 
not been addressed in the offshore decommissioning risk analysis context thus far. This 
methodology can comprehensively conduct a probabilistic risk analysis, considering the effect of 
new evidence to update probabilities, and validate developed model through sensitivity and 
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diagnostic analysis to assess potential fire and explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release. 
Consequently, preventing losses and ensuring safety. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows: The proposed integrated hierarchical Bayesian 
analysis and Bayesian networks model with advanced logic are briefly discussed in Section 2. 
Section 3 illustrates the case study and the application of the proposed methodology. Section 4 
offers the conclusion and future research evolving from this study. 
2. The Proposed Methodology 
It has been established that failure data of offshore wells under decommissioning are often sparse, 
and where there are such data, it is usually incomplete or non-absolute through similar operation 
from historical experience. To address this concern, it is imperative to develop a framework 
capable of aggregating the data to a considerable extent that it can completely represent the 
problem under study. The proposed framework is based on the incorporation of HBA with BN 
modelled through advanced logic to estimate causation events’ failure probabilities, re-assess the 
occurrence of a critical event characterized by leakage of formation fluids to the surface and, 
handle the issues of parameters uncertainty, respectively. The proposed framework is as illustrated 
in Fig. 1. 
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Figure 1. Proposed method algorithm 
2.1 Accident scenario Modelling  
The Minerals Management Service (MMS, 2000) reported the accident evolution during well P&A 
operations and identified the regions of potential compromise within the wellbore to be a leak 
through the zone isolation plugs, the lower plug and the upper plug. The safety-critical event 
defined in the report (i.e. leakage through mudline) is adopted as the pivot event within the BT. 
This present study focuses on the strategic leakage pathways within the wellbore during the 
offshore well abandonment operation and extends the identified paths to include dependencies 
among causations.  
2.2 Hierarchical Bayesian Modelling 
Following the BT construction, each causation event probability must be estimated using HBA. 
The data obtained for each event is often a guestimate according to risk assessor’s degree of belief 
or judgements and are typically subjective due to the different knowledge of the process. 
Guestimates are not accurate and may take the form of possibilities, probabilities or failure rates. 
 7 
Therefore, it is only practical to aggregate them systematically. HBA has a robust computation 
engine capable of handling bulk and divergent set of aggregated data (Lund et al., 2009). One 
crucial challenge during the HBA process is the credibility of assumptions relating to the precision 
of selected prior distribution function. The HBA model utilises a multi-level prior distribution 
function and can be impractical to solve numerically, especially, when the conjugate pairs have 
different distributions (Ferson et al., 2005). This study utilises gamma-function due to its similar 
conjugate properties to address this concern. The HBA as a statistical tool is employed to estimate 
the parameters of prior and posterior distributions in multiple stages modelled through the 
Bayesian method as highlighted in the following steps: likelihood functions definition, estimation 
of the informative priors and hyper-prior parameters, accordingly, with assumed mean and 
variance for the distribution function.  
2.2.1 Defining likelihood function 
In this first step, the likelihood function is defined concerning a specified parameter for a set of 
data emanating from the different source. This likelihood function, obtained through averaging of 
the specified parameter over all values within the parameter group, can be expressed as in Eq. (1). 
𝑓(𝑥|𝛼, 𝛽) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥|𝜓) ⋅ 𝑓𝑜(𝜓|𝛼, 𝛽) 𝑑𝜓  (1) 
With the adoption of gamma distribution on the specified parameter to confine the prior and 
posterior distributions as conjugate pair, the informative prior distribution and its corresponding 
hyper-prior parameters defined by a non-informative distribution can be incorporated to obtain the 
updated (posterior) second stage prior, given by the two-dimensional form of Bayes’ theorem, 
thus; 
𝑓1(𝛼, 𝛽|𝑥) =
𝑓0(α,β)⋅𝑓(𝑥|α, β)
∬ 𝑓0(α,β)⋅𝑓(𝑥|α, β)𝑑α 𝑑β
   (2) 
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To obtain the predictive posterior distribution, the first stage prior distribution is updated through 
instantiating the posterior of the hyper-prior parameters. The resulting predictive posterior 
distribution – termed the population variability curve (PVC) – can be obtained by Eq. (3) which 
can further be feed into the model as an informative prior distribution when non-absolute safety 
data is observed during case-specific trials as expressed in Eqs. (4) and (5).  
𝑓1(𝜓|𝑥) = ∬ 𝑓0(𝜓|α, β) ⋅ 𝑓1(α, β|𝑥) 𝑑α dβ    (3) 
𝑓1(𝜓|𝑥
−, 𝑥) =
𝑓1(𝜓|𝑥) 𝐿(𝑥
−
|𝜓)
∫ 𝑓1(𝜓|𝑥) 𝐿(𝑥
−
|𝜓)𝑑𝜓
    (4) 
𝑓1(𝜓|𝑥
−, 𝑥) ∝ 𝑓1(𝜓|𝑥) 𝐿(𝑥
−|𝜓)   (5) 
Where 𝑓1(𝜓|𝑥
−, 𝑥) = the updated posterior distribution with case-specific trials 
∫ 𝑓1(𝜓|𝑥) 𝐿(𝑥
−|𝜓)𝑑𝜓 = the likelihood function for case-specific trials 
𝑓1(𝜓|𝑥) = the predictive posterior distribution 
𝑓1(α, β|𝑥) = the posterior of the hyper-prior parameters 
 α, β = the shape and scale parameters, respectively (hyper-prior parameters) 
𝑓0(𝜓|α, β) = the first stage prior distribution for the data set 
 𝑓(𝑥|α, β) = the likelihood function of the hyper-prior parameters 
 𝑓0(α, β) = the second stage prior or hyper-prior distribution 
 𝜓 = the parameter under consideration (failure rate or probability) 
 𝑥, 𝑥− = the prior and posterior datasets  
The distributions of the hyper-prior parameters α and  β are assumed to have a gamma distribution 
with mean and variance (μx = αβ, σx
2 = αβ2) equal to 1.00e-4. 
2.2.2 Estimating failure probability 
Occurrence probability or failure rates are often required to conduct a probabilistic risk analysis. 
In the case of offshore decommissioning activities, such parameters are obtained from similar 
activities, historical data or accident precursor data. Several unrelated data are sometimes modelled 
using probability density functions (PDFs) based on the source-to-source variability techniques 
(Kelly and Smith, 2011; Yan and Haimes, 2010; Kelly and Smith, 2009) and prior knowledge of 
similar data – e.g. process, mining, aerospace and nuclear industries. One form of analyzing the 
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PDFs is to distribute a set of data indicating the frequency of successes 𝑥𝑖 observed over 𝑁𝑖 trials 
with Binomial properties such that; 
𝑃𝑓(𝑥𝑖|𝑃) = (
𝑁𝑖
𝑥𝑖
) 𝑃𝑥𝑖?̅?(𝑁𝑖−𝑥𝑖),  0 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑁𝑖 (6) 
The first stage prior distribution for the data set obtained from Eq. (6) gives; 
𝑓0(𝑃|𝛼, 𝛽) =
𝛤(𝛼+𝛽)
𝛤(𝛼)𝛤(𝛽)
𝑃(𝛼−1)?̅?(𝛽−1)   (7) 
In the case where discrete data representing the failure, 𝑥 is presented in the form of failure rate, 
𝜆 and exposure time, 𝑡, then the likelihood function follows a Poisson distribution given by Eq. 
(8). 
𝐿(𝑥𝑖|λi) =
(𝜆𝑖𝑡)
𝑥𝑖𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝑡
𝑥𝑖!
,          𝑖 = 0,1, ….    (8) 
The corresponding first stage prior distribution for the data set yields Eq. (9). 
𝑓0(𝜆|𝛼, 𝛽) =
𝛽𝛼𝜆𝛼−1𝑒𝛽𝜆
𝛤(𝛼)
    (9) 
 
2.2.3 Modelling syntax in MATLAB 
In the abundance of data obtained from a variety of sources, the most common method of 
processing such data has been through averaging. However, this averaging method often leads to 
inconsistencies in the results. Therefore, it is necessary to distribute this data set using the HBA 
formalism by adopting the sampling method that can yield structured data sets from the posterior 
predictive distribution as follows; 
𝑥𝑖~𝑏𝑖𝑛(𝑃𝑖 , 𝑁𝑖) 
𝑃𝑖~𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝛼, 𝛽) 
𝛼~𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(𝜇𝑥, 𝜎𝑥
2) 
𝛽~𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(𝜇𝑥, 𝜎𝑥
2) 
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In this paper, the gamma distribution model is coded in MATLAB (R2018a), taking advantage of 
its in-built gamma pdf tools (Fig 2). The aggregation procedure within HBA enables the failure 
probabilities to be obtained as a mean value with a 95% confidence interval. 
𝑓(𝑥), 𝑥 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘)
𝑇                 % Objective function 
𝑥𝑖(𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛)                          % Initialize a population of causations from source-to-source 
for 𝑖 = 1: 𝑛                                      % All 𝑛 source-to-source data points 
     for 𝑗 = 1: 𝑘                                 % All 𝑘 causation events 
      𝑁𝑗,𝑘(𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑁)                   % List the number of P&A operations 𝑁𝑗,𝑘 recorded  
   𝜇 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑥𝑖 . 𝑁𝑗,𝑘 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝑁𝑗,𝑘)⁄ )   % Estimate the mean parametrically 
   𝜎 = 𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝑥𝑖 . 𝑁𝑗,𝑘 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝑁𝑗,𝑘)
2
⁄ )     % Estimate the standard parametrically 
   (𝛼, 𝛽) = 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑑𝑓(𝜇, 𝜎)               % Estimate the shape & scale parameters 
end 
𝑝(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑝(𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖)                             % Obtain the mean probability from the distribution 
end 
Post-process results and visualization 
Figure 2. MATLAB code for probability estimation 
2.3 Quantitative failure modelling 
Following the accident scenario analysis conducted in section 2.1 and the prior probability 
estimation discussed in section 2.2.2, it would be necessary to construct a bowtie to depict the 
accident root causes and its evolution. The bowtie, consisting of fault tree on the right side and 
event tree on its left side, can represent the accident evolution in its entirety. However, the bowtie 
cannot handle real-time analysis unless it is coupled with advanced techniques. This is because of 
its fault tree and event tree constituents whose computation assumes that each root cause is 
statistically independent, which need not be true. Therefore, to conduct dynamic failure analysis, 
the bowtie must be mapped into a Bayesian network (BN) as shall be briefly discussed in section 
2.3.1. 
2.3.1 BT to BN Mapping procedure 
The mapping procedure involves converting each root cause, intermediate events and the top event 
of the fault tree into the root nodes, intermediate nodes and pivot node of the BN. Also, the safety 
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barriers events and consequence events of the event tree are converted into the safety nodes and a 
leaf node(s), respectively. More detail about the mapping algorithm can be found in the literature 
(Khakzad et al., 2013a; Baddredine and Ben Amor, 2010) 
2.3.2 BN modelling  
BNs are directed acyclic graphs (DAG) use to analyze complex interactions and conditional 
dependencies among events under uncertainty. The events are represented as nodes with associated 
conditional probability distributions (Nielsen and Jensen, 2009; Onisko et al., 2001). Each node of 
a BN denotes a discrete random variable and directed arcs linking the nodes reflect the logical 
dependencies among causations. Considering Fig. 3, with discrete variable, 𝐴𝑖 = 𝐴1, … ,  𝐴𝑛 the 
joint probability distribution follows the product rule given by Eq. (10). 
𝑃(𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛) = ∏ 𝑃(𝐴𝑖|𝑃𝑎(𝐴𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖=1     (10) 
Where 𝑃𝑎(𝐴𝑖) and 𝑃(𝐴𝑖|𝑃𝑎(𝐴𝑖)) are the parent node and CPT of 𝐴𝑖, respectively. In the presence 
of new evidence, knowledge or observation 𝜀, Eq. (10) can be reformed to estimate the posterior 
probability distribution in the form of Bayes’ theorem;  
𝑃(𝐴𝑖) =
𝑃(𝜀|𝐴𝑖)
𝑃(𝜀)
=
𝑃(𝜀,𝐴𝑖)
∑ 𝑃(𝜀,𝐴𝑖)𝐴𝑖
     (11) 
 
Figure 3. Typical BN structure. 
Further expansion of Eq. (10) yields Eq. (12) as follows. 
𝑃(𝑎1, … , 𝑎4) = 𝑃(𝑎4|𝑎3, 𝑎2, 𝑎1) ∙ 𝑃(𝑎3|𝑎2, 𝑎1) ∙ 𝑃(𝑎2) ∙ 𝑃(𝑎1)   (12) 
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Where 𝑎1, … , 𝑎4 are the occurrence outcomes of variables 𝐴1, … ,  𝐴4, respectively. It is worth 
mentioning that Eq. (11) can be used to perform consequence probability updating when new 
information about an event of interest is observed. It can also be used for sequential updating 
(also called probability adapting) when evidence of a consequence is given. 
2.4 Uncertainty modelling 
2.4.1 Uncaptured data uncertainty modelling 
Many relaxation strategies exist for modelling uncertainty. Notably, leaky noisy-OR (LN-OR) 
gates have been developed and demonstrated to account for the accidents initiated by uncaptured 
hazards (Antonucci, 2011). The LN-OR formalism is especially, applicable to a plugging and 
abandonment operation where reservoir conditions, the age of the well, mechanical, physical and 
chemical damages within the casings of the wellbore are all variables of uncertainty and could be 
more. As shown in Fig. 3, the accident contribution from each node  𝐴1, 𝐴2 and  𝐴3 is assumed to 
be independently capable of leading to the consequence node 𝐴4  when other root nodes are absent. 
In practice, this need not be true, as there are uncaptured hazardous events not represented in the 
model that can cause the failure of the system. These uncaptured events are accounted for by 
introducing an additional parameter 𝑙 ‘leaky probability’, such that 0 ≤ 𝑙𝑜 < 1. The leak 
probability assumes that the occurrence of uncaptured events will adequately provide new 
knowledge of the consequence event by incorporating another causal variable 𝐿, with a ‘link 
probability’, given by 𝑙𝑜 = 𝑃𝑖. It is to be noted that this additional parameter, albeit efficient, does 
not consider the uncertainty associated with leak probability, link probability and the outcomes of 
the parent variables in the accident model (Babaleye et al., 2019). These uncertainties can be 
modelled using data uncertainty modelling formalism.  
2.4.2 Data and parameters uncertainty modelling 
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An extension of the LN-OR – imprecise noisy-OR (ILN-OR) – is introduced to account for the 
uncertainty associated with elicitation parameters and unknown condition of the reservoir leading 
to inaccurate failure data state variables estimations in the risk model (Fallet-Fidry et al., 2012). 
The ILN-OR assumes that occurrence and non-occurrence representation of state variables are not 
sufficient due to the probability that the state variable may or may not exist. For the sake of 
simplicity, the leaky probability, and corresponding link probability are assigned a lower and upper 
bound, such that 𝑙𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑙𝑜 < 𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑃𝑖 ,𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝑖 < 𝑃𝑖 ,𝑚𝑎𝑥. Such assignments will enable the 
state variables to be represented as either being true, false or true-false simultaneously. This is 
primarily a practical way to obtain failure probabilities in intervals rather than discrete values, to 
provide the risk assessor enough information to develop a conservative safety mechanism. Thus, 
an extended CPT for the accident model is given by. 
P(Ai = {ai}|Aj,j≠i) = 1 − [(1 − 𝑙min) ∏ (1 − Pi,min)]i:ljϵAj    (13) 
 P(Ai = {a̅i}|Aj,j≠i) = [(1 − 𝑙max) ∏ (1 − Pi,max) ∙ ∏ (1 − Pi,max)]i:ljϵAij ]i:ljϵAj  
   (14) 
P(Ai = {ai, a̅i}|A𝑗,𝑗≠𝑖) = [(1 − 𝑙min) ∏ (1 − Pi,min)] − (1 −𝑖:𝑙j𝜖Aj
𝑙max) ∏ (1 − Pi,max) ∙ ∏ (1 − Pi,max)]𝑖:𝑙j𝜖Aij ]𝑖:𝑙j𝜖Aj       
      (15) 
Eqs. (13), (14) and (15) enable the states of both parent and child nodes to be specified with more 
than binary states. To incorporate the uncertainty of the states of the parent variables, 𝑎3, ?̅?3 a 
modality probability 𝑥 is assigned. For example, the CPT of 𝐴3 given the causations 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 is 
as presented in Table 1, where Pi,min is assumed to be equal to Pi,max and 𝑙o = 𝑙min = 𝑙max. 
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Table 1. Imprecise leaky noisy-OR CPT for node 𝐴3 
𝐴1 𝑎1 
 
?̅?1 
 
𝑎1, ?̅?1 
𝐴2 𝑎2 ?̅?2 𝑎2, ?̅?2 𝑎2 ?̅?2 𝑎2, ?̅?2 𝑎2 ?̅?2 𝑎2, ?̅?2 
𝑎3 p1p2 p1 𝑥p1  p2 𝑙o 𝑥𝑙o  𝑥p2 𝑥𝑙𝑜 𝑥
2𝑙o 
?̅?3 (1 − p1)(1 − p2) 1 − p1 1 − 𝑥p1  1 − p2 1 𝑥  1 − 𝑥p2 𝑥 𝑥
2 
𝑎3, ?̅?3 p2 + p1 − 1 2p1 − 1 
2𝑥p1
− 1 
 2p2 − 1 𝑙𝑜 
𝑥(𝑙o
− 1) 
 
2𝑥p2 − 1 𝑥(𝑙o − 1) 𝑥
2(𝑙o − 1) 
 
3 Application of Methodology 
The plugging and abandonment of offshore oil and gas wells is one of many rare events where 
accidents can escalate rapidly if the operational hazards are not captured wholly and carefully. 
3.1 Step 1: Leakage Scenario Modelling 
The problem formulation for the leak route of hydrocarbon within the offshore well during 
permanent abandonment operation (Fig. 4) is identified through visual inspection of the design 
schematics. The presence of pressure differentials between the production zone and the hydrostatic 
pressure or injection into other nearby wells, a build-up of pressure over a prolonged time can 
develop, leading to over-pressurization of fluid. The pressurized fluid within the production zone 
tends to migrate over the zone isolating barrier (B1) and the primary well barrier (B2) placed at the 
casing closest to the production zone. The ingress of formation fluid to the surface casing where 
there is a secondary well barrier further exacerbate the failure. Formation fluids then migrate 
uphole to the mudline if the stopped/balanced plug or secondary well barrier (B3) fails. The 
secondary well barrier is compromised due to surface casing corrosion caused by prolonged 
exposure of the migrating fluid or yielding of the casing due to internal loadings within the well 
such as formation loads or geological forces. The potential compromise of the secondary well 
barrier leads to the leakage of formation fluid through the surface casing (B4). The leak then 
deviates uphole and continue to the mudline through the hanger and/or seal assembly (B5) due to 
the presence of a path caused by de-bonding or annulus barrier degradation between the surface 
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and production casing. The leak then migrates freely toward the conductor casing (B6), following 
the failure of the secondary well barrier to provide containment. The migration towards the 
conductor casing is similarly a deviation uphole caused by insufficient barrier length in annulus or 
degradation of the annulus barrier. The insufficient barrier length is because of slippage due to 
inadequate barrier density or loss of barrier, thus, preventing the barrier from performing intended 
squeeze job. The migrating fluid can, at this point leak freely within the annulus to the conductor 
hanger assembly (B7). The leak through the hanger assembly is especially due to the contamination 
and degradation of the annulus barrier. The contamination arises from poor mud and filter cake 
removals, which leave a pathway for formation fluid to flow uphole, or, potential shrinkage of the 
barrier. Due to the subjective modelling of these leak routes, it is necessary to ensure that the 
results can be validated and applicable to all types of wells and locations with different geological 
formations. Therefore, this present work adopts the imprecise leaky noisy-OR model to address 
overall uncertainty – from the quantification of dependencies to reservoir conditions – in the 
analysis. 
 
Figure 4. Permanent well plug and abandonment leak route (MMS, 2000). 
3.2  Step 2: Consequence Modelling 
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This paper aims to examine the devastating accidents emanating from the release of hydrocarbon 
in an abandoned well subject to data sparsity. Typically, these accidents are characterized by the 
decommissioning personnel safety, environmental safety, loss of asset regarding fire and 
explosion. Personnel safety is accounted for by the loss of personnel's life during the plugging 
operation due to fire, explosion and suffocation. The environmental risk is defined by the amount 
of hydrocarbon spill and its adverse effect on marine lives, nearby residents, potential property 
damage and the cost of remediation. The loss of asset is attributed to the potential loss of the rig 
used for the abandonment operation. Fire and explosion are the main threat given the scenario that 
hydrocarbon has leaked uphole to mudline. The evolution of a catastrophe is assumed to emanate 
from the point where a leak exists, and this study assumes the well contained non-sour formation 
fluids. The leak propagates to the formation of fire or hazardous cloud until it is escalated through 
an ignition source. For a gas well, a jet fire (or pool fire for a liquid well) propagates. A vapor 
cloud is formed in the absence of an ignition source and may be escalated by the wind. The 
consequence of such leak from C1to C6 is shown in Table 3 and their occurrence sequence 
represented on the event tree constituents of Fig. 5. 
To prevent the occurrence of these consequences, five safety barriers have been identified such as 
hydrocarbon detection sensor (HDS), ignition prevention system (IPS), flame arrestor system 
(FAS), alarm and sprinkler (AaS), and emergency evacuation system (EES) as presented in Table 
4. The hydrocarbon detection sensor is a barrier designed to notify monitoring personnel if there 
has been polarity difference between water at mudline and leaked hydrocarbon. It prevents the 
occurrence of hydrocarbon release uphole to the surrounding water. The failure of the HDS 
activates the IPS, which controls the escalation of vapor cloud into pool fire in the likely event of 
fire and explosion.  The reliability of the ignition prevention system is an essential factor in the 
occurrence of catastrophe, as fire cannot ensue without the ignition barrier prior failure. The FAS 
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is immediately relied on to disconnect the combustion elements (temperature, oxygen and 
hydrocarbon), soon as fire and explosion events occur. The failure of the FAS escalated fire, loss 
of the offshore asset and nearby properties including casualties, necessitating the installation of an 
AaS system to consolidate the potential for fire and explosion. The EES reduces the extent of 
damage caused by fire and explosion due to the consequent failure of preceding safety barriers. 
The timing of the AaS to function is hugely important in this scenario; otherwise, the emergency 
evacuation plan might be insignificant following a catastrophe. The failure of the emergency 
evacuation plan leads to significant damage to offshore assets and nearby properties including 
fatalities.   
 
Figure 5. BT model representing failure during abandonment operation. 
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Figure 6. BN model for offshore well P&A operational failure. 
As seen in Fig. 4, the occurrence probability of safety barriers relies on the presence of the other 
safety barrier to demand its activation. For example, the emergency evacuation system is initiated 
sequentially following the failure of AaS, accordingly.  
3.3 Step 3: Data Collection and Processing 
The failure probability or reliability of each root node of the BN will be obtained from multiple 
sources, for example, within the similar sectors such as offshore drilling or completion activities, 
or completely different industry such as process systems, nuclear or mining decommissioning 
operations. Where failure events are unfamiliar, or impossible to obtain due to the uniqueness, 
expert opinion will be sought, in the form of guestimates and possibilities. The data presented in 
Table 2 is used to demonstrate the applicability of this model. 
Table 2. Causal events failure precursor data. 
Source 
Duration 
of the 
leak (𝑁𝑖) 
B2 B1.1 B1.2 B3.1 B3.2.1 B3.2.2 B4 B5.1 B5.2 B6.1.1 B6.1.2 B6.2 B7.1.1 B7.1.2 B7.2 
1 1 - 2 2 1 1 - 1 - 3 3 1 3 - 8 3 
2 3 1 - - - - 1 1 - 1 3 2 1 - 1 1 
3 3 - - 1 3 - 1 2 2 - 1 2 - - - - 
 19 
4 1 1 1 - 1 1 - 3 - 5 - 1 5 1 1 5 
5 1 2 - - - - 2 3 5 - 1 - - 2 10 - 
6 2 3 3 4 - 3 5 - 5 - 1 - - 3 3 - 
7 5 3 1 1 1 - 3 4 4 2 - - 2 3 3 2 
8 1 4 - - - - 2 - - - - 3 - 4 - - 
9 1 5 1 1 - 2 - 5 6 1 - - 1 5 - 1 
10 2 1 1 1 7 - 1 7 6 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 
 
3.4 Step 4: HBA modelling 
The failure data obtained from multiple sources from step 4 will be implemented within HBA 
modelling capabilities to aggregate the set of data into the marginal failure probability assigned to 
the root nodes as discussed in section 2.2. To fully implement HBA, the number of sources, 𝑛, the 
failure data set 𝑥𝑖, and the specified number of trials or demands, 𝑁𝑖 are all required to aggregate 
a suitable single value that would yield the same effect for the root node. HBA can then present 
these set of data as a distribution from which the suitable single value can be obtained. As noted 
in section 2.2.2, a failure data dependent on time will be distributed over Poisson likelihood 
function and those data collected based on mean time to failure (MTTF) will be modelled using 
exponential likelihood.  
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Figure 7. causation events' predictive posterior probability distribution. 
The same approach is repeated to compute the occurrence probability of all the implemented safety 
barriers. 
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Figure 8. Safety barrier predictive posterior probability distribution. 
 
3.5 Step 5: Bayesian Network Modelling  
Following the probabilities estimate approach in step 5 and the mapping procedure in step 3, BN 
will be used to assess and reassess the accident evolution and the interdependencies among 
interacting events. The interactions among events will be modelled through dependency 
knowledge and reflected in the CPTs of all child nodes. This information is then used as prior 
knowledge to predict the probability of an accident. Furthermore, the capability of BN will be 
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tested through forward and backward analysis. In the forward analysis, the probability of leaf node 
will be updated by instantiating one or more of the root nodes to a given state when new knowledge 
about their occurrence or non-occurrence become available. i.e. 𝑃(accident =
{true}|root node = {fails}). On the other hand, the backward analysis is used to obtain the 
posterior probability of root nodes given accident occurrence through instantiating the accident 
event to a specific state, i.e. 𝑃(root node = {fail}|accident = {true}).     
3.6 Step 6: Uncertainty Modelling  
The uncertainty in the model is addressed through the implementation of a leaky parameter of 
interest as a bounded interval. To elicit the CPT for the leak through the mudline, the values of 𝑙𝑜 
is assumed to vary between 0.00 and 0.005, respectively, i.e. 0.00 ≤ 𝑙𝑜 ≤ 0.005. The leaky 
probability boundaries offer the advantage of producing two sets of failure probabilities, which is 
in practice, realistic in a non-absolute and uncertain analysis. It is to be noted that each of the three 
causation nodes will be assigned three states, leading to 27 outcomes for each state of the leak 
through mudline event (pivot node), only 12 of these are shown in Table 5. For the sake of 
simplicity, 1.0 is assigned to the ignorance (T,F) model.  
Table 3. Top event conditional probability table extract. 
   Link probability TE failure CPT 
B1 B2 B3−7 PF PT PT,F 
T T T 0.005 0.090 0.905 0.005•(0.181)•(0.190)•(0.00038) 
T T F 0.688 0.310 0.002 0.688•(0.181)•(0.190)•(1-0.00038) 
T F T,F 0.765 0.015 0.220 0.765•(0.181)•(1-0.190)•1.0 
T F T 0.873 0.007 0.120 0.873•(0.181)•(1-0.190)•(0.00038) 
F T,F F 0.663 0.130 0.207 0.663•(1-0.181)•1.0•(1-0.00038) 
F T,F T,F 0.222 0.108 0.670 0.222•(1-0.181)•1.0•1.0 
F T T 0.815 0.085 0.100 0.815•(1-0.181)•(0.190)•(0.00038) 
F T F 0.238 0.680 0.082 0.237•(1-0.181)•(0.190)•(1-0.00038) 
T,F F T,F 0.081 0.901 0.018 0.081•1.0•(1-0.190)•1.0 
T,F F T 0.975 0.009 0.016 0.975•1.0•(1-0.190)•(0.00038) 
T,F T,F F 0.075 0.204 0.721 0.075•1.0•1.0• (1-0.00038) 
T,F T,F T,F 0.001 0.409 0.590 0.001•1.0•1.0•1.0 
      ΣP (leak thru mudline) = 0.513 
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3.7 Step 7: Updating Failure Evidence 
New evidence obtained through the predictive posterior distributions within HBA or entirely new 
data collected through real-time monitoring of the plugging and abandonment operation can be 
feed into the BN to update the degree of belief. In this study, failure probability updating is 
conducted through the instantiation of selected nodes to a specific state to obtain up-to-date 
posterior probabilities in both forward and backward analysis (Khakzad et al., 2013a; Bobbio et 
al., 2001). 
4 Result and discussion 
With the understanding that the accident was caused by the failure of mechanical barriers such as 
the isolation zone plug and the primary plug, the well P&A operational failure probabilities are as 
depicted in Fig. 7 and 8. The well P&A operational failure became imminent following the failure 
of these barriers. Table 4 showed the failure probabilities obtained through aggregation within 
HBA to address the concerns about data sparsity and source-to-source variability. It is to be noted 
that the failure data used in this study are those where dependencies among causations are 
considered (Table 4, column 5), and the dependencies are implemented within the CPTs using the 
imprecise leaky noisy-OR. Independent modelling of the events yields the same results in both 
conventional BT and BN (Table 4, column 4) which further confirms the efficiency of BN in 
dependency analysis. 
Table 4. Occurrence prior probabilities of causal events. 
Symbol EVENT DESCRIPTION Data Sources 
Failure probabilities 
independence dependency 
B1.1 Pressure buildup Aggregate 8.50E-02 8.50E-02 
B1.2 Injection into nearby well Aggregate 1.05E-01 1.05E-01 
B1 
Leak through zone isolation 
plug 
AND-gate 1.81E-01 2.13E-01 
B2 
Leak through lower/primary 
plug 
Aggregate 1.90E-01 1.90E-01 
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B3 
Leak through upper/secondary 
plug 
OR-gate 1.37E-03 1.84E-03 
B3.1 
Prolong exposure to migrating 
fluid 
Aggregate 1.47E-01 1.47E-01 
B3.2 Yielding of casing OR-gate 9.29E-03 1.02E-02 
B3−7 
Combined leak through upper 
plug 
OR-gate 3.80E-04 3.90E-04 
B3.2.1 Formation fluids load effect Aggregate 5.00E-02 5.00E-02 
B3.2.2 Geological forces effect Aggregate 1.86E-01 1.86E-01 
B4 Leak through production plug Aggregate 2.75E-01 2.75E-01 
B4−7 
Combined leak thru annulus-
production casing 
AND-gate 2.79E-01 2.89E-01 
B5 Leak through casing assembly OR-gate 3.54E-02 3.89E-02 
B5.1 De-bonding of plug and casing Aggregate 2.95E-01 2.95E-01 
B5.2 Annulus barrier degradation Aggregate 1.20E-01 1.20E-01 
B5−7 Leak through annulus barrier OR-gate 5.49E-03 6.01E-03 
B6 Leak through conductor casing OR-gate 6.10E-04 2.06E-03 
B6.1 Insufficient barrier length OR-gate 5.05E-03 5.62E-03 
B6.1.1 Inadequate barrier density Aggregate 5.95E-02 5.95E-02 
B6.1.2 Loss of barrier Aggregate 8.50E-02 8.50E-02 
B6.2 Annulus barrier degradation 
Aggregate 
1.20E-01 1.20E-01 
B6−7  
Leak through surface-annulus 
barriers 
AND-gate 
1.55E-01 1.27E-01 
B7 Leak through casing hanger 
AND-gate 
1.55E-01 1.69E-01 
B7.1 Contamination of barrier 
OR-gate 
3.90E-02 4.21E-02 
B7.1.1 Poor mud removal 
Aggregate 
1.75E-01 1.75E-01 
B7.1.2 Barrier shrinkage 
Aggregate 
2.25E-01 2.25E-01 
B7.2 Annulus barrier degradation 
Aggregate 
1.20E-01 1.20E-01 
 
For the safety barriers (Table 5), their failure rates are estimated for a seven-week for which the 
Elgin abandonment operation failed without consideration for the accident evolution over this 
period. The well P & A schematic investigated in this study is assumed to conform to the minimum 
plugging requirements set out in NORSOK D-010, that is, with at least two cement barriers and a 
mechanical plug. Although, the number of barriers required depends on some factors such as 
geological location, the operator's policy and regional best practices. Also, the state variables of 
the root and safety nodes are assumed to be binary that is, ‘works or fails’ to illustrate the 
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occurrence and non-occurrence of the events. On the other hand, the intermediate nodes leading 
to the occurrence of the leak through mudline (top event) all have three states (true/false/true, 
false) to account for the uncertainty of modelled data, elicitation of CPTs, and un-modelled 
parameters. The states of the leaf node, 𝐶𝑖 are binary with six outcomes.  
Table 5. Occurrence probabilities of safety barriers. 
Symbol Barrier description 
Failure 
probabilities 
HDS Hydrocarbon detection sensor 2.31E-01 
IPS Ignition prevention system 1.04E-01 
FAS Flame arrestor system 6.81E-02 
AaS Alarm and sprinkler 3.12E-02 
EES Emergency evacuation system 1.42E-02 
 
4.1 Consequence analysis 
The consequence events are investigated by modelling the CPTs of the leak through mudline 
as discussed in section 3.7 for the initial leak probability. Initiating the BN solver in Fig. 6 with 
marginal probabilities for all root nodes obtained the HBA and CPTs for all child nodes, it is 
observed that a leak through mudline prior failure probability of 0.51346 yields the occurrence 
prior probabilities of all the consequence outcomes as shown in Table 6, column 4. This top 
event prior probability is due to failures emanating from leaks through the zone isolation plug 
(0.18108), the primary/lower plug (0.19000) and the upper/secondary plug (0.000381).  
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Figure 9. Microanalysis of consequence dependency on the top event. 
Table 6. Occurrence probabilities of consequence events. 
Symbol Attributes CONSEQUENCE DESCRIPTION 
Failure probabilities 
𝑙𝑜 𝑙𝑜
− 𝑙𝑜
+ 
C1 Safe State Safe condition 5.60E-1 4.92E-1 9.76E-01 
C2 
Hydrocarbon 
Release 
Near miss with no remediation 
required 
2.96E-1 2.26E-1 3.41E-01 
C3  Vapor Cloud 
The incident with minor injuries 
and equipment loss 
8.12E-2 1.61E-2 9.42E-02 
C4 Pool Fire 
Accident with fire, few deaths 
and a minor spill 
6.22E-2 5.52E-2 7.79E-02 
C5 Casualties 
Accident with fatalities, 
explosions and major spill 
4.00E-4 1.30E-4 8.32E-04 
C6 Fatalities 
A catastrophe with fatalities, rig 
loss and a considerable spill 
1.80E-4 1.17E-5 2.08E-4 
 
4.2 Model validation 
The model is validated through leaky probability’s lower and upper bounds to investigate the 
applicability of the framework in practice. The minimum and maximum leak probabilities in the 
analysis are sequentially incorporated. That is, 5.00E-3 is replaced with 2.00E-3 and 1.00E-2, 
separately. These values demonstrate the influence of un-modelled parameters such as uncaptured 
reservoir conditions during the hazard identification process and unknown failure data and 
uncertainty in the leak and link probability assignments. Re-running the analysis yield a notable 
change in the occurrence probability of the leak through mudline from 5.13E-1 to 2.25E-1 and 
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9.33E-1, respectively. With the lower bound value, the occurrence probability of the accident is 
seen to decrease by 56%. Whereas an increase of 82% is obtained for the upper bound value, 
indicating that a high leaky probability would imply a conservative risk analysis. Accordingly, the 
occurrences of the consequence events are seen to have increased considerably with an increased 
leaky probability (Table 6). This result can provide invaluable insight into the acceptable risk 
tolerance to be put in place during the P & A operation. The imprecise LN-OR further confirms 
the importance of a thorough understanding of the hazards in a permanent well abandonment 
operation.   
4.3 Probability Updating 
To estimate the posterior probabilities of the model when new evidence of any or all the accident 
causations become available, selected root nodes are instantiated to ‘failed’ state. For instance,  
instantiating B1, B2, and B5  through forwarding analysis leads to a 71% increase in the safe state; 
78% in the hydrocarbon release; 77% in vapor cloud; 62% in the pool fire; 82% in the casualties; 
and 8% in the fatality’s occurrence probabilities. The results show that the occurrence of 
casualties’ event C5 is the most probable consequence. Similarly, by instantiating the consequence 
node 𝐶1 as new evidence through backward analysis, the posterior probabilities of all nodes are 
obtained and presented as shown in Table 7. The leak through mudline failure increased by 47% 
leading to 35% increase in the leak through zone isolation plug; 34% leak through lower (primary) 
plug; and, 47% increase in the combined leak through the upper plug. 
4.4 Safety-critical analysis 
The non-occurrence of the devastating accidents is dependent on the strength of influence of each 
contributory causation. Some of the causations are more influential than others, and it is essential 
to identify these through sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis is performed by instantiating 
either the leak through mudline failure or the most devastating consequence to 100%, through 
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backward propagation. Concerning the ILN-OR formalism with leak probability of 0.5%, the 
consequence ‘vapor cloud' is instantiated and the updated (posterior) probabilities of the causations 
(root nodes) are obtained and recorded as shown in Table 7. Comparing the prior and posterior 
probabilities alone is not enough to make certain safety improvements to the whole abandonment 
operation, as all causations tend to increase by varying factors. Therefore, a ratio of variation, 
IMROV gave in Eq. 10 is adopted.  
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑂𝑉(B𝑖) = |
𝛽(B𝑖)
𝛼(B𝑖)
− 1|     (10) 
Where 𝛼(B𝑖) and 𝛽(B𝑖) are the prior and posterior probabilities of events B𝑖.  
  
Figure 10. Critical events response to fire and explosion occurrence. 
A closer look at Table 7, column 5 revealed that the leak through zonal isolation plug (B1), 
injection into nearby well (B1.2), leak through the lower/primary plug (B2), and the formation fluids 
pressure build-up (B1.1) are the critical safety events that require the highest amount of resource 
allocation. Also, the leak through the upper/secondary plug (B2), combined leak through the 
upper/secondary plug (B3−7) and the degradation of annulus barrier are also responsive to the 
slightest change in the consequences’ variation, indicating that safety measures are necessary to 
prevent escalating the accidents. For instance, the occurrence of the vapor cloud would have been 
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caused by a failure of the topmost barrier plug leading to hydrocarbon leakage through the mudline 
by 79.3%.  
Table 7. Comparison of prior and posterior probabilities of critical nodes. 
Symbol FAILURE DESCRIPTION 
Failure probabilities with 𝑙𝑜 
prior posterior IM
ROV(%) 
B1.1 Pressure buildup 8.50E-2 1.15E-1 35.12 
B1.2 Injection into nearby well 1.05E-1 1.42E-1 35.12 
B1 
Leak through zone isolation 
plug 1.81E-1 2.45E-1 
35.12 
B2 
Leak through lower/primary 
plug 1.90E-1 2.55E-1 
34.31 
B3 
Leak through upper/secondary 
plug 1.37E-3 1.55E-3 
13.14 
B3.1 
Prolong exposure to migrating 
fluid 1.47E-1 1.47 E-1 
0.10 
B3.2 Yielding of casing 9.29 E-3 9.47 E-3 1.94 
B3−7 
Combined leak through upper 
plug 3.80E-4 4.60E-4 
21.05 
B3.2.1 Formation fluids load effect 5.00E-2 5.02E-2 0.34 
B3.2.2 Geological forces effect 1.86E-1 1.86E-1 0.08 
B4 Leak through production plug 2.75E-1 2.75E-1 0.05 
B4−7 
Combined leak thru annulus-
production casing 
2.78E-1 2.79E-1 
0.05 
B5 Leak through casing assembly 3.54E-2 3.54E-2 0.01 
B5.1 De-bonding of plug and casing 2.95E-1 2.95E-1 0.01 
B5.2 Annulus barrier degradation 1.20E-1 1.20E-1 0.23 
B5−7 Leak through annulus barrier 5.49E-3 5.50E-3 0.18 
B6 Leak through conductor casing 6.10E-4 6.10E-4 0.07 
B6.1 Insufficient barrier length 5.05E-3 5.05E-3 0.00 
B6.1.1 Inadequate barrier density 5.95E-2 5.95E-2 0.00 
B6.1.2 Loss of barrier 8.50E-2 8.50E-2 0.00 
B6.2 Annulus barrier degradation 1.20E-1 1.20E-1 0.23 
B6−7  
Leak through surface-annulus 
barriers 
1.55E-1 1.55E-1 
0.00 
B7 Leak through casing hanger 1.55E-1 1.55E-1 0.05 
B7.1 Contamination of barrier 3.90E-2 3.94E-2 0.96 
B7.1.1 Poor mud removal 1.75E-1 1.75E-1 0.27 
B7.1.2 Barrier shrinkage 2.25E-1 2.26E-1 0.40 
B7.2 Annulus barrier degradation 1.20E-1 1.20E-1 0.23 
 
The approach in this study is limited in its applications due to the potential errors associated with 
the analogous data which may not represent specific hazard during well P&A, and the estimation 
of the leak probability that cannot be empirically calculated from sparse data. In addition, the focus 
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of this model is on offshore wells and minor modifications may be required to address other types  
of wells. However, as the decommissioning operations become matured and reliable data collected, 
a case-specific failure analysis can be performed with significant reduction of uncertainty. 
5 Conclusions 
The present study investigates the uncertainty related to unknown reservoir conditions which may 
complicate the safety of offshore wells undergoing plugging and abandonment operation. The 
P&A operational failure analysis is conducted using a Hierarchical Bayesian model. The model 
assists in estimating the aggregate failure probabilities of causations. This model is tested in the 
abandonment of oil and gas wells where knowledge of hazards in its entirety is vague, and data is 
sparse. 
Furthermore, the obtained probabilities are used in the Bayesian network to model comprehensive 
accident evolution and the uncertainty using appropriate relaxation technique. The Bayesian 
network also accounted for the dependencies amongst interacting causations. The relaxation 
technique introduced here, is based on an imprecise leaky noisy-OR gate formalism, to account 
for the uncertainty in modelling parameters, parameter relaxation, and uncaptured hazards during 
the hazard identification process. The relaxation technique enabled the probability values to be 
presented at interval, with lower and upper bounds. The upper bound represents a conservative 
safety analysis and offers decision-makers the advantage to develop a safety improvement strategy 
within these bounds, making this approach practical. This is confirmed by the 82% increase as the 
base case analysis with 𝑙𝑜 = 5.00𝐸 − 3 is replaced with upper bound where 𝑙𝑜
+ = 1.00𝐸 − 2, 
whereas a reduction of 56% is recorded when 𝑙𝑜
− is substituted for 𝑙𝑜. Through model validation, 
an occurrence of the safe state consequence yielded a corresponding up-to-date probability of leak 
causations. Safety-critical analysis conducted through the ratio of variation further indicated that 
the leak through the lower plug, leak through zonal isolation plug, injection into nearby well, and 
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the formation fluids pressure build-up within the wellbore are the most sensitive events leading to 
the eventual leak of hydrocarbon through the mudline and consequent accident evolution. The 
forward propagation analysis conducted by instantiating selective causation events to ‘fail’ states, 
revealed that casualties’ event C5 is the most critical consequence, evidenced by an 82% increase 
from its prior.  
The main contribution of this study is in the development and application of the (i) HBA model to 
obtain aggregated mean of failure data emanating from different sources, and (ii) imprecise leaky 
parameter which helped to quantify overall uncertainty, thereby providing complete, 
comprehensive and realistic safety improvement for well plugging and abandonment decision-
makers. The notable results of this study indicate that the safety analysis requires non-absolute 
probabilities to provide the boundary of values from which acceptable risk tolerance may be 
estimated.  
The practical advantage of the developed HBA model is in its application to offshore oil and gas 
wells based on sparse data, reservoir evolution and parameters uncertainty. The applicability of 
the model is limited by post-abandonment failure evolution, onshore wells and estimation of 𝑙𝑜 
due to lack of actual data.  Future studies following from this work will examine cascading of 
failure among the barriers within the wellbore; dynamic hierarchical BN to provide insight into 
the sequence of failure over time; and the concept of copula to investigate the failure of well 
plugging and abandonment from averaging probabilistic perspective. 
Acknowledgements 
The authors thankfully acknowledge the funding provided by the John Blackburn Main fellowship 
granted through the Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and Technology (IMarEST), United 
Kingdom; and the Natural Science and Engineering Council of Canada and the Canada Research 
Chair (CRC) Tier I Program in offshore safety and risk engineering. 
 33 
 
References 
Amir Gergerechi, Eigil Sorensen, Jan Erik Jensen. 2016. Report of the investigation of the well 
control incident in well 31/2-G-4BY1H/BY2H on the Troll field with Songa Endurance 
drilling unit. <http://www.ptil.no/getfile.php/ > (accessed on July 20, 2018). 
Antonucci, A., 2011. The imprecise noisy-OR gate. In: 2011 Proceedings of the 14th International 
Conference on Information Fusion (FUSION). IEEE, pp. 1–7. 
Arzaghi, E., Abaei, M.M., Abbassi, R., Garaniya, V., Binns, J., Chin, C., Khan, F., 2018. A 
hierarchical Bayesian approach to modelling fate and transport of oil released from subsea 
pipelines. Journal of Process Safety and Environmental Protection. 118, 307-315. 
Babaleye, A. & Kurt, E.R., 2019. Safety Analysis of Offshore Decommissioning Operation 
through Bayesian Network. Journal of Ships and Offshore Structures. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17445302.2019.1589041. 
Babaleye, A., Kurt, E.R., Khan, F., 2019. Safety Analysis of plugging and abandonment of oil and 
gas wells in uncertain conditions with limited data. Journal of Reliability Engineering and 
System, 188, 131-141. 
Bachu, S. & Watson, T. L. 2009. Review of failures for wells used for CO2 and acid gas injection 
in Alberta, Canada. Energy Procedia, 1, 3531-3537. 
Badreddine, A., Ben Amor, N., 2010. A dynamic barriers implementation in Bayesian-based bow-
tie diagrams for risk analysis. In: Proceedings of International Conference on Computer 
Systems and Applications, pp. 1–8. 
Bobbio, A., Portinale, L., Minichino, M., Ciancamerla, E., 2001. Improving the analysis of 
dependable systems by mapping FTs into Bayesian networks. Journal of Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, 71, 249–260. 
Chakraborty, S., and Chowdhury, R., 2017, “Hybrid Framework for the Estimation of Rare Failure 
Event Probability,” Journal of Engineering Mechanics (published ahead of print). 
El-Gheriani, M., Khan, F., Chen, D and Abbassi, R., 2017a. Major Accident Modelling Using 
Spare Data. Journal of Process Safety and Environmental Protection. 106: 52-59. 
El-Gheriani, M., Khan, F., Chen, D and Abbassi, R., 2017b. Rare Event Analysis Considering Data 
and Model Uncertainty. ASCE-ASME Journal of Risk and Uncertainty in Engineering 
Systems, Part B: Mechanical Engineering. 3:1-15. 
Fallet-Fidry, G., Weber P., Simon C., Iung B., Duval C., 2012. Evidential network-based extension 
of Leaky Noisy-OR structure for supporting risks analyses. 8th IFAC Symposium on Fault 
Detection, Supervision and Safety of Technical Processes (SAFEPROCESS). Mexico City, 
Mexico. August 29-31. 
Ferson, S., 2005. Bayesian methods in risk assessment. Unpublished Report Prepared for the 
Bureau de Recherches Geologiques et Minieres (BRGM). New York. 
Hua, B., Bie, Z., Au, S. K., Li, W., and Wang, X., 2015, “Extracting Rare Failure Events in 
Composite System Reliability Evaluation Via Subset Simulation,” IEEE Trans. Power 
System. 30(2): 753–762. 
Kelly, D., and Smith, C. L., 2011. Bayesian inference for probabilistic risk assessment: A 
practitioner's guidebook. Springer Science and Business Media. 
Kelly, D. L., and Smith, C. L., 2009. Bayesian inference in probabilistic risk assessment: the 
current state of the art. Journal of Reliability Engineering & System Safety. 94(2): 628-643. 
Khakzad, N., Khan, F., Amyotte, P., 2013a. Dynamic safety analysis of process systems by 
mapping bow-tie into the Bayesian network. Process Saf. Environ. Prot. 91: 46–53.  
 34 
Kiran, R., Teodoriu, C., Dadmohammadi, Y., Nygaard, R., Wood, D., Mokhtari, M., Salehi, S., 
2017. Identification and evaluation of great integrity and causes of failure of well integrity 
barriers (A review). Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering. 45: 511-526. 
Li, J., Li, J., and Xiu, D., 2011. “An Efficient Surrogate-Based Method for Computing Rare Failure 
Probability,” Journal of Computational Physics. 230(24): 8683–8697. 
Lunn, D., Spiegelhalter, D., Thomas, A., & Best, N., 2009. The BUGS project: Evolution, critique 
and future directions. Statistics in medicine, 28 (25): 3049-3067. 
Minerals Management Service, 2000. Risk Assessment of Temporarily Abandoned or Shut-in 
Wells. Report 99041, Contract No: 1435-01-99-RP-3995. 
Nielsen, T.D., Jensen, F.V., 2009. Bayesian Networks and Decision Graphs. Springer Science & 
Business Media. 
NORSOK D-010, 2013. Well Integrity in Drilling and Well Operations. NORSOK Standard D010, 
revision 4. Standards Norway, Lysaker. <http://www.standard.no/pagefiles/1315/d-
010r3.pdf>. 
Onisko, A., Druzdzel, M.J., Wasyluk, H., 2001. Learning Bayesian network parameters from small 
data sets: application of Noisy-OR gates. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning. 
27, 165-182. 
Ouyang, S. and Allen, E. 2017. Offshore well abandonment: challenges and approach with DNV 
GL guideline of risk-based abandonment. Offshore Engineering and Technology, 1(1): 71-
83. 
Schobi, R., Sudret, B., and Marelli, S., 2016, “Rare Event Estimation Using Polynomial-Chaos 
Kriging”. ASCE-ASME Journal of Risk Uncertainty in Engineering Systems. Part A, 
(published ahead of print March 28, 2016). 
Siu, N.O., and Kelly, D.L., 1998. Bayesian Parameter Estimation in Probabilistic Risk Assessment. 
Journal of Reliability Engineering System Safety. 62(1–2): 89–116. 
Total (2013). <http://www.elgin.total.com/elgin/pressrelease.aspx?contentid=640> (accessed on 
July 20, 2018). 
Woodyard, A.H. 1982. Risk analysis of well completion systems. Society of Petroleum Engineers, 
9414: Journal of Petroleum Technology. 713-720. 
Yan, Z., and Haimes, Y. Y., 2010. Cross-Classified Hierarchical Bayesian models for risk-based 
analysis of complex systems under sparse data. Journal of Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety. 95(7):764–776. 
Yang, M., Khan, F., and Lye, L., 2013. “Precursor-Based Hierarchical Bayesian Approach for rare 
event frequency estimation: A Case of Oil Spill Accidents,” Journal of Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection. 91(5): 333–342. 
 
 
